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Abstract Individuals with autism spectrum disorders supposedly have an affinity with information and
communication technology (ICT), making it an ideally suited media for this population.
Virtual environments (VEs) – both two-dimensional and immersive – represent a particular
kind of ICT that might be of special benefit. Specifically, this paper discusses the importance
of psychological theory for VE designed for this population. I describe the contribution that
different theories of autism (e.g., theory of mind, executive function, weak central coherence
theory) have made and can make, as well as the potential of other non-autism-specific theories
(e.g., embodied cognition). These technologies not only illuminate our understanding of
autism, but they can also be used to develop new technologies for people without autism. So,
as well as being an area of specialism, I argue that VE research in autism has extended – and
will go onto – the boundaries of human–computer interaction more generally. This is because
autism provides a unique window into human social communication and learning. Further,
this field offers a chance for better inclusivity for individuals with autism within a digital
society.
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Introduction
Despite being around since the mid-1990s, the evi-
dence base for virtual environments (VEs) for individu-
als with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) is relatively
small. Hence, it remains a rich and challenging area,
with still many unknowns; so there are good grounds
for exploring ideas. I hope to illustrate this array of
exciting avenues for research and application in this
paper. I begin with a brief overview of autism and
information and communication technology (ICT)
because this area has become a research specialism in
itself and also VE represents a particular kind of ICT
that might be especially beneficial for people with
autism. I then go on to discuss how different theories
provide new ways of understanding and treating autism
using VE. Finally, I conclude with more speculative
thoughts about what the future might hold.
Throughout the paper, I take a developmental psy-
chopathological viewpoint (Cicchetti, 1984). From this
perspective, it is assumed that we can learn more about
the typical functioning of an organism by the study of
its pathology and, similarly, more about its pathology
by studying its typical condition (Cicchetti, 1984). So,
I argue that the relationship between people with
autism and ICT is important for at least three reasons.
First, it can tell us a great deal about the interests
(and aversions) of people with this condition. Second,
it offers a myriad of opportunities to intervene, to
support, and facilitate skills development in people
with autism. Third, research into ICT and autism ben-
efits our understanding of human–computer interaction
more generally.
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I also use the term VE to include virtual reality (VR),
which usually involves a level of three-dimensional
(3D) representation. In recent review of the applied
work in this area, Parsons and Cobb (2011) critique the
studies to date of VR and autism. They conclude that
despite limited research, VR does have unique poten-
tial for children with autism. Here, rather than reiterate
their points, I will focus on the role of psychological
theory in VEs for individuals with autism.
Brief overview of autism
ASD (henceforth autism) are currently characterized as
a group of syndromes: autism per se (sometimes known
as autistic disorder), Asperger syndrome, and pervasive
developmental disorders-not otherwise specified – in
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(Fourth Edition, Text Revision) [American Psychiatric
Association (APA), 2000]. All three fall under the over-
arching category of pervasive developmental disorders
(APA, 2000). Autism is currently diagnosed and con-
ceptualized as a triad of impairments in socialization,
communication and repetitive interests (APA, 2000).
However, the nosology of autism seems likely to change
with the advent of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (Fifth Edition), in which the autism
spectrum looks set to become unified as an umbrella
term (ASD) with degrees of severity, but no subtypes
(Lord & Jones, 2012; Skuse, 2012). Additionally, the
triad of impairments seems likely to become a dyad of
social-communication deficits and restricted/repetitive
behaviours (Lord & Jones, 2012; Skuse, 2012).
Notwithstanding any diagnostic changes, theoretical
accounts have tried to explain the paradox of how this
triad can be expressed in different individuals of dif-
fering ages and with different intellectual abilities, and
within the same individual across their lifetime.
Despite decades of research, however, there is no
definitive answer to what is core to the disorder other
than that it is developmental. Over the past 25 years or
so, the cognitive theories of autism [theory of mind,
executive dysfunction, weak central coherence (WCC)]
have been hugely influential in understanding different
aspects of autism (see Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007, for
a review). However, the general consensus seems to be
that a single unifying theory of autism may not be
possible, but a multifactorial account may be the most
parsimonious one (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006;
Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006; Penning-
ton, 2006; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). Yet, even this
may not be whole story given the lack of stability of
performance over time in tasks tapping into these three
cognitive processes (Pellicano, 2010).
Brief overview of theories of autism
Autism is perhaps, therefore, best conceptualized as a
multifaceted condition: a disorder of social cognition, of
cognition, of emotion, of perception and of movement.
I will return to all these themes in greater detail under the
auspices of the different theories. Importantly, these
theories are not mutually exclusive and each has a role in
illuminating autism in its totality (Rajendran & Mitch-
ell, 2007). The theory of mind hypothesis of autism has
perhaps been the most influential theory in recent years.
In essence, this theory states that individuals with
autism fail to ‘impute mental states to themselves and
others’ (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515) and that
this deficit shows itself as inability to mentalize, or
failure to take into account others’ mental states. The
theory of mind hypothesis can therefore explain some of
the most profound repercussions of autism: from diffi-
culties in making friends (often leading to loneliness) to
problems understanding that what people say can be
different from what they mean (e.g., nonliteral language
such as sarcasm and figures of speech).
As a developmental precursor to theory of mind, the
enactive mind hypothesis (Klin, Jones, Schultz, &
Volkmar, 2003) posits that from infancy onwards the
autistic1 mind is not attuned to social stimuli in the same
way as the neurotypical mind; for example, following
another’s eye gaze and a preference for biological over
mechanical motion. Klin et al. (2003) argue these early
developmental differences lead to downstream prob-
lems in the development of theory of mind and other
aspects of social cognition. Specifically, joint attention
is the mechanism by which eye gaze is used to follow or
direct another person’s attention to a point of reference
(Kim & Mundy, 2012); for example, an adult points out
a new animal to the child, or the child wants to show the
adult a toy that he wishes to play with.
Although not a theory of autism per se, referential
communication does require elements of theory of
mind: in taking someone else’s perspective into
account. Here, classic studies in developmental psy-
chology from Piaget (1926) onwards have investigated
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how children take another’s knowledge state into con-
sideration in being an effective communicator.
In contrast to the above theories, the executive
function (EF, e.g., Russell, 1996) theory of autism did
not arise from neurotypical research; rather, its concep-
tion came from researchers who noted that some symp-
toms of autism were similar to those associated with
specific brain injury in adults (particularly to the frontal
lobes). EF is an umbrella term for behaviours needed
for goal-directed behaviour (e.g., planning, cognitive
flexibility, inhibition, etc.), so EF theory is particularly
useful when trying to understand the autistic need for
sameness, a difficulty switching attention and lack of
impulse control. An additional strength of EF theory –
which is only beginning to be realized – is that it can
also explain some of the motor and movement self-
regulatory aspects of autism (Rajendran & Mitchell,
2007).
A key strength of WCC theory (Frith, 1989) is that
it explains some of the non-social (as well as the
social) features of autism, such as the attention to
acute detail that ranges from pedantry to obsession.
The essence of the theory is that typically developing
individuals process information by extracting the
overall meaning or gist. Whereas, the ‘cognitive style’
of individuals with autism is the opposite: to process
the constituent parts rather than the global whole.
Another important aspect of this theory is that it is
non-pejorative, in the sense that it makes predications
about better performance in individuals with autism.
Whereas the theory of mind hypothesis of autism, by
contrast, is based on a deficit rather than difference
conceptualization of autism – and, therefore, makes
predications about worse performance in individuals
with autism.
Although WCC is a discrete theory in itself, other
theories have come in its wake to also try and explain
perpetual processing in autism. For example, reduced
generalization theory (Plaisted, 2001) states that indi-
viduals with autism have reduced processing of the
similarities that are held between stimuli and situations
– and this can explain why generalizing learning from
one situation to another can be so hard for individuals
with autism. Enhanced perceptual processing (Mottron,
Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006) makes an
even stronger claim than WCC theory by suggesting that
across-the-board perceptual processing is generally
better in individuals with autism; for example, in
individuals with autism with savant syndrome (Mottron
& Belleville, 1993).
Finally, I will discuss embodied cognition: how psy-
chological processes are influenced by the body (Glen-
berg, 2010). Recently, movement researchers have
argued that understanding the motoric aspects of
autism helps us also to understand the cognitive aspects
of autism (Izawa et al., 2012). Here, I argue that as ICT
devices become more movement based (e.g., Microsoft
Kinect), this can be exploited to both better understand
autism and help design the next generation of human–
computer interfaces.
Autism and ICT
Within the last decade or so, ICT and autism have
become a research specialism in itself arguably
because ICT seems intrinsically less socially threaten-
ing (Swettenham, 1996; Trepagnier, 1999; Rajendran
& Mitchell, 2000; Parsons & Mitchell, 2002; Rajen-
dran, Mitchell, & Rickards, 2005; Goodwin, 2008).
Additionally, in certain contexts the slower pace and
asynchronous aspects of some ICT interfaces (e.g.,
email, text chat/instant messaging) have been argued to
be more in tune with the autistic style of learning and
interaction (e.g., Rajendran & Mitchell, 2006). This
has led to arguments that ICT can provide not only a
route into the social world for individuals with autism
(Rajendran & Mitchell, 2006; Durkin, 2010; Jones,
2010), but also controversies.
‘Aren’t you just making people with autism more
autistic using ICT?’
One oft-voiced criticism is that ICT is just going
to make an already socially isolated person more
withdrawn, more autistic and less likely to interact with
people (Howlin, 1998; Latash, 1998). At its most
extreme, Greenfield (Swain, 2011) has gone as far as
saying the Internet might even cause autism. However,
Bishop (2011) makes a strong case against this.
There are two arguments against this position. First,
there is no evidence to suggest that ICT exacerbates the
social-communicative problems in autism (or any other
aspect of autism for that matter). Second, ICT often
facilitates interactions with others either directly
(because the person with autism tries to gain the atten-
tion of someone nearby, e.g., Alcorn et al., 2011, or via
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the help of a teacher, e.g., Parsons, Leonard, & Mitch-
ell, 2006), or indirectly because they are communicat-
ing with another person via ICT (either via a shared
computer, e.g., Rajendran et al., 2005, or via a
network, e.g., Rajendran & Mitchell, 2006; Parsons,
Millen, Garib-Penna, & Cobb, 2011). Indeed, the
importance of a facilitator, be it a parent or a teacher,
cannot be understated in helping to structure ICT inter-
actions. In short, working with ICT increases rather
than reduces opportunities for communication between
the child and the adult (Porayska-Pomsta et al., 2012).
‘Change the environment, not the person’
Diametrically opposed to the ‘dangers of ICT’ view
(e.g., Howlin, 1998; Latash, 1998) is one that advo-
cates the benefits of ICT for individuals with autism.
So, as a contrast to interventions, the crux of this argu-
ment is that ICT can be used to change the world to suit
the individual with autism rather than try to change
the person with autism to fit into the world. Indeed,
humans have always used technology (in its broadest
sense) to augment their own cognition (Clark, 2003)
and I argue that individuals with autism can similarly
use ICT for their own needs.
I will now describe how different psychological
theories have been used to both develop VE and under-
stand VE use in autism. I start with the theories that
have been the most influential to date, and end with
those I believe hold future promise.
Theory of mind and the enactive mind
After the film show, Jim Blinn, who’s one of the pio-
neers in this field, came running up to me and said,
‘John, I have to ask you a question.’ And I thought,
‘God, I don’t know anything about these algorithms; I
know he’s going to ask me about the shadow algorithms
or something like that.’And he asked me, ‘John, was the
parent lamp a mother or a father?’
The above quote is from an interview (McCracken,
1990, p. 1) of John Lasseter, founder of Pixar, about
the impact of Luxo Jr. – the film Lasseter credits as
the breakthrough for computer-animated films. Luxo
Jr. involves a series of interactions between a small
‘mischievous’ lamp and a larger more ‘nurturing’ larger
lamp. According to Lasseter, this breakthrough came
about because people started to focus on the animation
rather than the technology (indeed the angle poise lamp
became the icon of Pixar). In an analogous way, I argue
that psychological theory should always be at the heart
of development of human–computer interactions rather
than the technology itself. For example, Klin et al.’s
(2003) enactive mind theory states that from infancy
the autistic mind is not attuned to the social world. For
example, the gaze and gaze following patterns of indi-
viduals with autism are different from typically devel-
oping individuals and notably the eye region does not
capture attention as strongly in those with autism
(e.g., Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002).
Klin (2000) began to construct his arguments from a
social attribution task in which individuals with and
without autism were shown Heider and Simmel’s
(1944) silent animation of geometric objects interact-
ing with each other. The participants with autism
tended to describe the animation in mainly geometric
terms: for example, ‘The big triangle went into the
rectangle. There were a small triangle and a circle. The
big triangle went out. The shapes bounce off each
other. The small circle went inside the rectangle. The
big triangle was in the box with the circle. The small
triangle and the circle went around each other a few
times . . .’ (Klin, 2000, p. 840). Whereas the typically
developing individuals searched for social meaning:
‘What happened was that the larger triangle – which
was like a bigger kid or bully – had isolated himself
from everything else until two new kids come along
and the little one was a bit more shy, scared, and the
smaller triangle more like stood up for himself and
protected the little one . . .’ (Klin, 2000, p. 840. Words
in italic represent social attribution, from Klin, 2000).
So, in stark contrast to the autistic mind, the typi-
cally developing mind seems prepared to interpret
social meaning, and arguably overextends this capacity
to find social meaning even in nonliving entities
(Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007) – as in Luxo Jr.
However, it has only recently been investigated (in the
ECHOES project, below) if, or under what conditions,
individuals with autism attribute intentionality to
virtual characters.
Joint attention
ECHOES (e.g., Porayska-Pomsta et al., 2012) was
designed to provide children with and without autism
with learning environments in which joint attention2
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could be experienced and practised with a virtual char-
acter via a large touch screen. Briefly, joint attention is
the ability to coordinate attention between oneself,
object(s) in the environment and another person (e.g.,
Farrant, Maybery, & Fletcher, 2011). A classic exem-
plar of joint attention is proto-imperative pointing, in
which the individual points out something in the envi-
ronment to share with another person. This ability is
thought to be unique to humans (e.g., chimpanzees can
‘point to want’, but not ‘point to show’) and its impor-
tance is so great that the development of language and
social cognition (i.e., theory of mind) has been argued
to be its post-cursor (e.g., Tomasello, 2008).
With respect to autism, joint attention is thought to
be disrupted and, hence, leads to downstream problems
in development (Charman, 2003). Indeed, there is
evidence that the ability to engage in joint attention
predicts subsequent language development in children
with autism (McDuffie, Yoder, & Stone, 2006). The
premise behind ECHOES was that if children with
autism have an affinity with ICT, and they could be
provided with the experience of joint attention in VE,
then perhaps their joint attention ability could be
improved.
With this aim in mind, Alcorn et al.’s (2011) virtual
character (Paul) asked children to help him collect
flowers. In this prototype learning environment, Paul
indicated which one of the three flowers in the fore-
ground he wanted, either by gazing or pointing to the
flower. In addition to these gaze indicators or gestures,
Paul either first ‘looked out of the screen’ (as if making
eye contact with the child) or made no eye contact with
the child.3
Children with autism were found to be fastest4 in
identifying Paul’s flower selection only when his gaze
or point to the flower was preceded by a ‘mutual
gaze’ (Alcorn et al., 2011). Although preliminary, a
rich interpretation is that children with autism were
treating Paul differently depending on the context, and
perhaps they were fastest when responding because
they perceived the ‘mutual gaze’ as a communicative
act. However, because this was an initial study no typi-
cally developing children were included to see if they
had a similar pattern of responding. Another caveat is
that this was not true mutual gaze (cp. Pellicano
& Macrae, 2009). However, the most up-to-date
ECHOES system has the potential to monitor the par-
ticipant’s gaze upon the screen (via a webcam eye
tracker) and so ‘knows’ where the child is looking (see
Kim & Mundy, 2012, for a system of this type). In turn,
the system could conceivably tell Paul where to find
and ‘look’ at the participant, because it knows the par-
ticipant’s location from a movement sensor. With both
the eye tracking and movement sensor systems func-
tioning, a better operationalization of mutual gaze
(than anything else to date) is possible (cp. Pellicano &
Macrae, 2009). Further work is clearly needed to rep-
licate and extend these findings, but the early data are
promising in that children with autism responded to
Paul and did not treat him as if he were a bunch of
pixels; for example, some of the children greeted and
said goodbye to Paul. So, some children with autism
appear to go beyond the material evidence and respond
in some way to the animacy of Paul. This suggests that,
while mere physical movements and collisions are
insufficient to evoke animacy representations in chil-
dren with ASD (Klin, 2000, above), when they interact
with the richer contents of VE, greater potential is
illuminated.
Intriguingly, despite the dominance of tests of false
belief in the developmental literature, as the test of
theory of mind (Low & Perner, 2012), there has been
little evidence of this paradigm being used as a frame-
work for VE for individuals with autism. This may
stem from both engineering and theoretical considera-
tions. First, it might be beyond our current technology
to create such complex process needed for analogues of
unexpected location change or unexpected context
tests. Second, when researchers have tried to formally
teach children with autism to pass tests of false belief it
seems that the children ‘may have learned to pass the
tasks rather than understanding the concepts underly-
ing the rules’ (Hadwin, BaronCohen, Howlin, & Hill,
1996, p. 359). So, theoretically, it might be more sen-
sible to create VE for children with autism based on the
developmental precursors to false belief understanding
than on the task itself.
Referential communication
The key difference between collaborative virtual envi-
ronments (CVEs) and most other VEs is that collabo-
rative VEs require two participants rather than a single
user. Here, the onus is on both participants to work
together. As well as conceptual problems of under-
standing others’ minds (theory of mind), individuals
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with autism also have perceptual problems of coordi-
nating visual perspectives (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989).
To this end, the COSPATIAL project (e.g., Parsons
et al., 2011) located pairs of children in different physi-
cal spaces from each other. However, the children had
to collaborate with each other in a shared virtual space.
So, for example, one child with autism would sit in
front of computer screen depicting a 3D room. While in
a separate physical room, another child with autism
would be in front of a computer screen depicting the
same virtual room. These children then had to work in
collaboration to build a tower using coloured blocks to
match a pattern. To do this, the children had to select
jointly a block with the colour combination that suited
both their needs; that is, they had to verbally commu-
nicate (speaking via a headset) their individual needs
and negotiate with someone else for mutual benefit.
Early pilot data (Garib-Penna & Parsons, 2011;
Parsons et al., 2011) showed that although the autistic
dyads found collaborating difficult, they nevertheless
could succeed with help from a facilitator.
Although COSPATIAL is the first VE to have two
participants with autism working together, the theoreti-
cal basis for CVEs has a long history in developmental
psychology in referential communication (e.g., Piaget,
1926; Krauss & Glucksberg, 1969; Donaldson, 1978;
Robinson & Whittaker, 1987) and peer collaboration
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2000). These theories, along with
visual perspective role-taking and cognitive behav-
ioural therapy, helped inform the design of COSPA-
TIAL, thereby directly targeting aspects of autism that
are known to be problematic (Garib-Penna & Parsons,
2011; Parsons et al., 2011).
Executive function
Multitasking
Multitasking is an EF, which is itself an umbrella term
for all those faculties needed to work in a motivated
fashion, towards a goal that may not be reached
instantly (Gillberg & Coleman, 2000). These functions
include planning, cognitive flexibility, generativity,
inhibition, self-monitoring, etc. (see Hill, 2004, for a
review of EF in autism). Rajendran et al. (2011) used
the virtual errands task (VET: McGeorge et al., 2001)
to look more closely at multitasking (the ability to
interleave several tasks in a limited time period) in
autism. The VET is a 3D representation of a building in
which participants navigate along corridors and up and
down strairwells using a mouse. Rajendran and col-
leagues used the VET to investigate if whereabouts task
performance might break down; for example, planning,
memory, etc. Using a VE allowed (1) the participant to
be the actual agent who has to complete the tasks
(something that is hard to control ethically and experi-
mentally in everyday life, see Shallice & Burgess,
1991, for the pitfalls of studying multitasking in the
real world); (2) performance could be recorded for later
detailed coding. So, arguably the VE provided both a
degree of ecological validity and opportunities for
fine-grained performance evaluation. Rajendran et al.
(2011) found that planning inflexibility, inhibition and
difficulties with prospective memory (remembering
to carry out intentions) may lie behind multitasking
difficulties.
Behavioural regulation/inhibition
As well as investigating intentionality, a serendipitous
outcome of ECHOES (Alcorn et al., 2011) was that the
temporal arrangement of ECHOES seemed to help
children regulate their behaviour. Specifically, in order
to ‘know’ which of the three flowers Paul selected, the
participant had to wait until Paul made a selection. At
the beginning of experiment, some children made a
flower selection without waiting for Paul’s indication.
However, by the end of the experiment these children
had seemingly learned to wait before reacting to Paul.
In parallel to this, these children needed less physical
support (gentle holding of the shoulders by the teacher)
and showed less stereotypical rocking (motoric EF)
by the end of experiment. So, subjectively it seemed
that ECHOES had the potential to help motor self-
regulation (see Sayers, Oliver, Ruddick, & Wallis,
2011, for an overview of stereotypic movement in
autism). However, this needs to be corroborated by
comparing the children’s baseline rocking in the class-
room to that within ECHOES. This potential for motor
self-regulation is made possible because movement is
integral to ECHOES: that is, the child has to move
to touch the screen, to act in space. So, arguably,
ECHOES and other non-desk-based technologies
intrinsically accommodate the motoric aspects of
autism. Indeed, myself and others have argued that
autism needs to be viewed in its totality as both a
movement and social cognitive disorder (Rajendran &
G. Rajendran6
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Mitchell, 2007; Mostofsky & Ewen, 2011) – and
movement-based VEs have the potential to accommo-
date this.
Self-monitoring
As well as being someone to interact with, a virtual
character can also provide self-monitoring information.
So, one useful intervention would be to provide feed-
back (self-monitoring) about where to look on some-
one’s face because eye gaze monitoring is problematic
in autism (e.g., Klin et al., 2003; Norbury et al., 2009).
This would be tricky to do in real life, but relatively
simple in a VE. Grynszpan et al. (2012) ingeniously
used a remote eye tracker to monitor gaze towards a
virtual character. Using the eye tracking information,
Grynszpan et al. created a ‘lens’ over the character
image. If one looked through the lens, the image was
clear, but outside the lens the image was opaque.
During the pre- and post-test stages the lens was uncon-
strained (so participants could use their gaze to control
the lens and look anywhere they wished). However,
during the intervention the lens was constrained to the
virtual character’s face. So, at this stage the partici-
pants could learn that the lens helps see the virtual
character more clearly. This learning would only occur,
however, if the participants were able to self-monitor,
to have essentially a meta-awareness of their own eye
gaze control. Intriguingly, despite the intervention, the
ASD group showed a lack of awareness of being able to
control the lens. Despite this initial null finding, the
authors suggest that their paradigm hold promise for
helping with improving self-monitoring skills in ASD.
WCC theory
Reduced generalization
No VE for individuals with autism has been yet
designed using WCC theory as its principle guiding
framework. However, one of the theories that came in
its wake – reduced generalization theory (Plaisted,
2001) – offers insight into issues of transferring learn-
ing from a VE to the real world. This vexed issue of
generalizing learning is arguably the ‘holy grail’ for
any autism intervention because it has proved notori-
ously difficult to illicit and detect behaviour change
from one context to another (Spence & Thurm, 2010).
For example, from a learning environment to the real
world, from the classroom to the home, etc., this diffi-
culty is exacerbated by the plethora of unsubstantiated
interventions (Dingfelder & Mandell, 2011) and the
desperation of parents in seeking treatments for their
children (Sharpe & Lee Baker, 2007).
Even when studies are well resourced and well
specified, detecting change in such a heterogeneous
condition as autism is difficult. For example (in a
non-VE study), using large-scale randomized control
trials, and targeting specific behaviours (i.e., joint
attention), Green et al. (2010) changed behaviours at
the proximal level by increasing parental interactions
with their child, but this did not influence the more
distal level of reducing autism symptoms. Green et al.
argue that this difficulty in generalization is due to the
attenuation of the effect of the intervention. So, the
intervention becomes less effective (see Rao, Beidel, &
Murray, 2008, for the effectiveness versus efficacy dis-
tinction) as you move from the actual point of inter-
vention to more ‘downstream’ measures.
With the development of VE, researchers were
quick to argue for the benefits of using VEs for gen-
eralizing learning from the VE to everyday life for
individuals with autism (Goodwin, 2008; see Parsons
& Cobb, 2011, for a recent review; Trepagnier, 1999;
Parsons & Mitchell, 2002). The AS Interactive Project
(e.g., Parsons et al., 2006) was a pioneering study
which provided individuals with autism social skills
training in queuing (how typically British) and finding
a seat on a bus or in a café. Such skills may require
some level of social judgment for typically develop-
ing people, but should not prove overly difficult.
For individuals with autism, however, the subtleties of
unwritten rules and social etiquette can be extremely
anxiety provoking and debilitating. So, a VE offers a
chance to practise such social skills within a managed
situation. Additionally, guidance and explanations can
be provided by a facilitator, and the tasks can be prac-
tised repeatedly, without fear of making a mistake or
being rebuked. Additionally, the level of complexity
(more people, more noise, etc.) can also be adjusted –
and, so, when ready the individual can try out these
skills in the real world. Although Mitchell, Parsons,
and Leonard (2007) did not go as far testing learn-
ing in everyday life, they did find that behaviour
learned in the VE did generalize to making judgments
about where one would sit in a photograph of
a bus.
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I argue here that VE can be exploited to test a theo-
retically based (but as yet empirically untested) way to
more easily generalize behaviour from the virtual
learning environment to the real world. Plaisted’s
(2001) reduced generalization theory not only offers an
explanation as to why generalizing learning is so diffi-
cult for individuals with autism, but also a potential
solution. As an alternative to WCC theory (Frith,
1989), Plaisted argues that perceptual processing in
autism can be explained as reduced processing of the
similarities that are held between stimuli and situa-
tions. That is, individuals with autism have narrower
concepts and sharper and more clearly delineated per-
ceptual boundaries. So, a typically developing child
who learns something in the classroom should theoreti-
cally have no problem in generalizing this to his home
(because he easily processes the similarities between
the classroom and home). In contrast, a child with
autism may find this more difficult because his process-
ing style only allows for generalization to take place in
a more perceptually gradual and graded way; for
example, by making the classroom more home-like and
the home more classroom-like. VE seems ideally suited
to this task because the transition from one environ-
ment to another can be directly controlled. That is, by
gradually changing the learning environment (Parsons
& Mitchell, 2002) to make it as perceptually similar as
possible to the new environment. So, to facilitate gen-
eralization, practitioners could alter the learning envi-
ronment by progressing through series of intermediary
‘graded’ stages, by changing colours, textures, lumi-
nance, etc.
Enhanced perceptual processing
Where does reality lie? In the greatest enchantment you
have ever experienced. (Hugo von Hofmannsthal, as
cited in Curry, 2012, p. 76)
As a more radical variant of WCC theory, Mottron and
colleagues argue that perception in autism is not only
different, but is also superior (enhanced perceptual
processing, Mottron et al., 2006). Any such qualitative
difference between people with and without autism
seems likely to be starker if one’s senses become
totally immersed. For example, in an immersive virtual
reality (IVR), the individual wears device(s) that give
the wearer the sense of being in another reality (see
Slater, 2009, for a review of IVR). Indeed, Slater
(2009) argues that the best IVR systems provide visual,
auditory and haptic input. In contrast, a VE is 3D
representation on a two-dimensional display and –
according to Slater – does not have the same sense of
place of plausibility illusion (of really being there) of
IVRs. Most autism research to date has been with VEs,
but a few have investigated IVRs. Wallace et al. (2010)
were the first to investigate how children with autism
perceived an IVR relative to typically developing chil-
dren. Immersing the children in a residential street, a
school playground or school corridor allowed the
researchers to record the children’s perceptual and
social responses. Wallace et al. found that, although the
children were passive observers, they showed similar
levels of place of plausibility illusion (of really being
there) as the typically developing comparison in chil-
dren. More recently, Mundy and colleagues have used
IVR to look at social attention (Jarrold et al., 2011).
For example, Jarrold et al. (2011) investigated chil-
dren’s scanning patterns when they were immersed in a
virtual classroom and found that children with autism
showed less attention to virtual peers furthest from the
central character than IQ-matched controls. Jarrold
et al. also found that attention to an array of virtual
peers distinguished the autism group from the control
group more powerfully than attention to non-social
objects (with the autism group showing decreased
attention to the virtual peers). Interestingly, attention to
both social and non-social virtual characters/objects
was associated with academic achievement, above
and beyond variance associated with IQ in the
autism sample (P.C. Mundy, personal communication,
August 1, 2012).
Future research questions, in this area, might be to
investigate if the perceived levels of immersion in IVRs
interact with the perceptual superiority (Mottron et al.,
2006) that individuals with autism might have. Addi-
tionally, IVR arguably holds still greater promise
because it has both sensory motor and social cognition
qualities (e.g., through interacting with virtual charac-
ters) – both of which are affected in autism (Rajendran
& Mitchell, 2007; Sayers, Oliver, Ruddick, & Wallis,
2011; Wallace et al., 2010).
The question of reality is, however, not only just
about the physical environment, but also about the
nature of the virtual people populating that environ-
ment. This, too, is open for insight via studies
with individuals with autism. We already know that
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individuals with autism are less susceptible to prior
(top-down) knowledge interfering with their object
visual perception than typically developing individuals
(Ropar & Mitchell, 2002). What we do not know is if
there is a point at which they might baulk at virtual
characters for being ‘too human’.
The uncanny valley phenomenon (Mori, 1970)
occurs when people show a disdain for representations
of humans that are too close to human form for comfort
(see also Parsons, 2007; Gray & Wegner, 2012; Pollick,
2010). So, people generally have no aversion to robots
and other human analogues provided they are not too
human. As they become perceptually more human,
however, a point is reached (the uncanny valley) when
these creations are no longer accepted. To date, the
virtual humans in autism research have rendered virtual
characters from stylized cartoon forms (e.g., Porayska-
Pomsta et al., 2012) to more human-like representa-
tions (e.g., Ehrlich & Miller, 2009; Cheng & Ye, 2010;
Wallace et al., 2010). The style in which to depict
virtual humans can be a question of resources as much
as of design. However, active decisions have also been
made in not trying for too much human realism (e.g.,
Porayska-Pomsta et al., 2012). Arguably, if the content
is right, then striving for realism may not be as impor-
tant as other factors. In fact, it would be interesting to
investigate whether individuals with autism prefer
virtual humans who are more or less realistic. However,
this question might be moot provided the participant
imbues the character with mental life – that is, has prior
(top-down) expectations of the character’s beha-
viour (Alcorn et al., 2011; Porayska-Pomsta et al.,
2012).
Pollick (2010) states that the uncanny valley is ready
for renewed investigation. He argues that this phenom-
enon might result from issues of physical perception,
biological motion perception and/or social cognition.
Autism is affected in all these areas and so autism
research into this phenomenon would be insightful into
the boundaries of what humans in general perceive as
being ‘real’ or not.
Embodied cognition
An increasingly important question in psychology is
how the body shapes the mind (e.g., Clark, 1999;
Wilson, 2002; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010), that is, embod-
ied cognition. The Cartesian view of the separateness
of mind and body has been a dichotomy that has argu-
ably held back our understanding (Glenberg, 2006).
Nowhere is this seen more starkly than in autism,
which is either conceived as a movement disorder
(Mostofsky & Ewen, 2011) or a social–emotion disor-
der, rather than in its entirety (Rajendran & Mitchell,
2007; Mostofsky & Ewen, 2011). Specifically, the
movement aspects (e.g., Sayers et al., 2011) seem
divorced from the emotion and cognitive aspects
(Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007), when in fact they should
arguably be considered in a more unified way. Imita-
tion researchers have, however, been trying to link
these aspects of development (see Rogers & Williams,
2006, for a review of the imitation research field). This
is because imitation requires both representational
aspects (i.e., relating self to other for copying another’s
actions) and motoric aspects (i.e., actually executing a
movement that one wishes to copy) (Stieglitz Ham
et al., 2011). For example, we can use gesture imitation
to find out exactly at what point the individual has an
imitative problem. So, if someone with autism fails to
imitate a gesture, we can now pinpoint whether it is
because he cannot adequately represent that gesture in
his mind, or because he fails to execute the gesture
movement (e.g., Stieglitz Ham et al., 2011).
In tandem with research into imitation in autism,
there has been a recent resurgence in the study of
embodied cognition (Goldman & de Vignemont, 2009;
Porayska-Pomsta, Bernardini, & Rajendran, 2009;
Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Glenberg, 2010). For
example, Tversky and Hard (2009) found that when
typically neurotypical adults saw a photograph of a
person reaching for an object it helped improve their
own perspective taking of the scene (indeed the mere
presence of the person helped when compared with a
photo with no one present). Additionally, Cook and
Tanenhaus (2009) found that a speaker’s hand gestures
(but not his/her speech) encoded information about
solving a planning task (Tower of Hanoi) to a listener.
There are also examples in the developmental litera-
ture: for instance, babies who crawled through a space
found hidden objects more than babies who were
carried (Benson & Uzgiris, 1985). In another study,
children who walked through an imagined space were
better able to state the locations of objects in the real
space than are those who sat still while imaging the
space (Rieser, Garing, & Young, 1994; for reviews, see
Glenberg, 2010 and Lillard, 2007, Chapter 2).
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So, both the fields of imitation and embodied cogni-
tion allude to the importance of being able to move in
space for cognitive development. This was taken into
consideration in the design of systems such as
ECHOES (e.g., Porayska-Pomsta et al., 2012) in which
the child has to move to interact with the virtual char-
acter (as opposed to sitting with a console in hand). The
capacity to move may be highly functional for indi-
viduals with autism. Indeed, the stereotypic movement
of some children with autism may help regulate their
levels of arousal (McDonnell, 2010). Hence, the chil-
dren who regulated their own stereotypic rocking (see
above) took advantage of this aspect of ECHOES.
Additionally, the relation between movement and cog-
nition might be more readily studied in such VE
systems – because these systems not only provide the
opportunity for the child to move, but also can measure
the movement non-invasively.
Concluding thoughts
Each of the theories I have discussed has something to
offer VE research and autism. They can provide a
framework, insight, direction and inspiration – and
arguably, without them, the technologies might not
fulfil their full potential. This is because each theory
provides a different a perspective on human psychol-
ogy. So, VE research in autism includes some of the
most quintessential aspects of the human experience:
from understanding others’ intentions (theory of mind)
to managing everyday tasks like shopping (multitask-
ing). Part of being human is also how we have always
used technology to augment our own minds, and this
area of research also provides insight on this process.
Psychological theory often has relevance to central
research questions, thereby potentially informing the
initial design stage, through evaluation and back again
to theory. This process is naturally iterative and one
that I believe will enhance our understanding of autism.
However, the pay-offs are potentially greater still. This
is because autism can be considered a disorder of social
cognition, of cognition, of emotion, of perception and
of movement, and as such, it provides a unique window
onto human–computer interaction. This ‘finessing’ of
the human condition helps illuminate these different
aspects of human–computer interaction – and through
careful study we can create better technologies for
everyone.
Despite its importance, theory is only one of many
other considerations that will guide the development of
technologies; others include educational objectives,
user-centred design processes, usability, affordances of
the technology, and so forth. These considerations
all stem from the fundamental aims of the research –
which can range from interventions (e.g., teaching
social skills) to basic research (e.g., investigating the
process of multitasking). So, theory is just one aspect
in the development and evaluation process of VE for
individuals with autism – and crucially the point at
which theory is enacted will very much depend on
these initial research aims.
Finally, as we enter an era in which games consoles
and keyboards are being replaced by our own move-
ments, the interface is likely to change (perhaps to
include interactions with virtual humans) – and our
minds will evolve as they have arguably always done.
This brave new world also has the potential to be a
more accepting one, by including previous excluded
members of society – like individuals with autism. The
fundamental premise of the discipline of human factors
and ergonomics – in the design process – is to fit
the system to the person, not the other way around
(Grandjean, 1980). So, we might consider using tech-
nology in analogous way to change the environment
and not the person.
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1See Gernsbacher, Sauer, Geye, Schweigert, and Goldsmith (2008) for why
autistic is a respectful term.
2See Mundy and Newell (2007) for a comprehensive description of joint
attention.
3Previous work has shown that typically developing 1-year-olds know that
when an adult makes direct eye contact, this is perceived by the child as a
communicative act (Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005).
4Accuracy was equally high in all conditions.
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